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INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2004, a divided three-judge panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit handed down a ruling which 
certainly pleased the agricultural industry but which disappointed health 
and environmental groups.2 The decision left the agricultural industry 
free to continue its practice of burning its crop residue, while leaving the 
health and environmental groups and the citizens of surrounding 
communities gasping for air. The dispute arose between Kentucky 
bluegrass farmers3 in portions of Idaho and citizens in surrounding 
communities, and concerned the farmers’ practice of burning their fields 
after the harvesting of Kentucky bluegrass seed.4 In Safe Air for 
Everyone v. Meyer, the issue was whether crop residue, left over after the 
harvest of Kentucky bluegrass, is a “solid waste”5 as that term is defined 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA” or 
“Act”).6 If the crop residue were considered to be a solid waste, the 
plaintiffs would have a cause of action to enjoin the farmers from 
burning their fields under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA.7 Two of 
the three judges hearing the case held that the crop residue at issue was 
not a solid waste, and dismissed the case without a trial on the merits.8 
One judge dissented, stating that RCRA applies to post-harvest crop 
residue and that the case should be remanded for a trial on the merits.9 A 
petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed and, at the time of this 
writing, is awaiting a response from the Supreme Court of the United 
States.10 
The ultimate outcome of this case is literally life or death for at-risk 
residents of the surrounding communities. Safe Air For Everyone, a 
1,000-plus member non-profit corporation, was formed by Idaho 
                                                                                                             
 2 See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 3 Throughout this comment, I refer to the defendants as “farmers”, rather than 
“growers.”  Throughout the briefs in this case, the plaintiffs refer to the defendants as 
“growers” and the defendants refer to themselves as “farmers”. The plaintiffs’ concern 
might have been that courts will have more sympathy for “farmers” than they would have 
with “growers” due to American ideology, which tends to romanticize the farming 
culture. J.B. Rulh, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, n.9 (2000). My use of the term “farmer” does not necessarily mean 
that my views coincide with those of the defendants. I use the word “farmer” simply 
because it seems more natural to me. 
 4 Safe Air, 373  F.3d at 1038. 
 5 Id. at 1041. 
 6 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (2000). 
 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 8 Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1047. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Pet. For A Writ Of Cert. By Pet’r Safe Air For Everyone, Safe Air For Everyone v. 
Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1055). 
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physicians solely to put an end to the growing health care crisis in the 
region caused by the defendants’ open-field burning practices.11 In its 
complaint, the plaintiff alleged that at least three people had died as a 
result of “episodes of acute respiratory distress precipitated by grass 
residue burning.”12 Additionally, the complaint alleged that adverse 
health effects included “irritation of the eyes, nose and mouth; increased 
coughing and wheezing; increased respiratory illness; difficulty 
breathing; decreased lung function; and possible development of lung 
disease,”13 and that children, the elderly, and people with asthma, heart 
disease and other respiratory illnesses are particularly placed at risk due 
to the high concentrations of fine and coarse particulate matter in the 
smoke from the burning fields.14 
For the farmers, many of whom moved their operations to Idaho in 
the wake of the State of Washington’s recent ban on the practice of open-
field burning, convenience, efficiency and profits are all at stake.15 The 
defendants, seventy five individuals and corporations who grow 
Kentucky bluegrass for commercial profit in two areas of Northern 
Idaho,16 alleged that crop residue burning is a necessary step in the 
growing process as it “allows for the enhancement of water quality 
because it deters soil erosion into the air and water as the result of the 
lack of soil disturbance.”17 The defendants also argued that the practice 
of open-field burning is necessary for many other reasons that are 
“integral to producing consistent and maximum yields of a healthy seed 
crop the following year.”18 These benefits include “stimulation of the 
soil, recharging the root system, providing nutrients for the grass, 
clearing the field and soil of harmful parasitic pests . . . eliminating 
destructive mold and fungus growth . . . and ridding the soil of weed 
growth.”19 The defendants argued that there are no practical alternatives 
to open-field burning and that mechanical removal of the crop residue 
                                                                                                             
 11 Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 3-4, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 12 Compl. at 92-93, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 13 Id. at 90, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 14 Id. at 91, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 15 During the Safe Air trial at the district court level, Grant Pfeifer, the air quality 
section supervisor for the Washington State Department of Ecology, testified that the 
State of Washington concluded that grass residue burning was a health concern. In 1998, 
the state banned the burning of grass seed fields finding that there were reasonable 
alternatives to burning. Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 17, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 16 Id. at 4, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 17 Br. for Defs.-Appellees at 7, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 18 Id., Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 19 Id. at 7-8, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
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would not only deprive them of the benefits of burning, but would be 
economically ruinous.20 
The State of Idaho has been very friendly to the growers’ concerns 
and has actually encouraged Kentucky bluegrass farmers in Washington 
State to relocate their operations to Idaho, where there are very limited 
restrictions on the practice of open-field burning.21 Additionally, Idaho 
recently sought to amend its federal Clean Air Act State Implementation 
Plan (“SIP”) in an attempt to specifically list crop residue disposal as an 
allowable category of open burning under the SIP.22 That proposal, 
which has the preliminary approval of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, is currently working its way through the rulemaking process. 
Furthermore, Idaho’s Right to Farm statutes provide further protections 
to agribusiness by severely restricting the rights of citizens to file 
common law nuisance claims against growers of Kentucky bluegrass.23 
The defendants argued that they are not disposing, discarding or 
getting rid of the crop residue, because they use the crop residue by 
burning it, an indispensable step in the growing cycle.24 The plaintiffs 
argued that the primary reason that the defendants burn the crop residue 
is to remove it in the most inexpensive manner.25 The farmers’ true 
motivation for burning their fields seems to be a question of fact, 
inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment. Yet two of the three 
judges on the panel, looking at the facts in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, found that there was no material question of fact in dispute and 
that the crop residue was not a solid waste as a matter of law.26 
It is my contention that crop residue is a solid waste, that the 
plaintiffs have raised substantial issues of material fact, and that they are 
entitled to injunctive relief. There are three reasons why the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in the case should be overturned. First, the legislative 
                                                                                                             
 20 Id. at 8-27, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 21 For example, an official with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe testified at trial that number 
of acres burned on that reservation has increased from 14,000 acres a few years ago to 
30,000 acres today, as a result of farmers moving from Washington State after 
Washington State banned crop residue burning. Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 17, Safe Air (No. 
02-35751). Idaho encourages these farmers to move their operations from neighboring 
states by codifying the farmer’s right to burn under the Idaho Smoke Management and 
Crop Residue Disposal Act and Idaho’s Rules for Crop Residue Disposal. IDAHO CODE 
§22-4803 (2004).  Additionally, Idaho exempts farmers from common-law nuisance 
attacks under Idaho’s Right to Farm Law, set forth in IDAHO CODE §§22-4501 to 22-
4504 (2004). 
 22 Clean Air Act Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans; Idaho, 
69 Fed. Reg. 109 (proposed May 22, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 23 IDAHO CODE §§22-4501 to 22-4504. 
 24 Br. for Defs.-Appellees at 7, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 25 Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 36, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
 26 Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1047. 
2005] SAFE AIR FOR EVERYONE EXCEPT IDAHO 241 
history makes it clear that Congress intended crop residue to be included 
within the scope of RCRA. Second, the prior circuit court cases, which 
the Ninth Circuit relied on in its opinion, addressing the issue of solid 
waste all deal with industrial, manufacturing and municipal solid waste, 
not agricultural waste. Third, common sense dictates that what the 
farmers are doing here is getting rid of the grass residue, not recycling it 
for some beneficial purpose. 
Moreover, Congress clearly intended a broad reading of this Act.27 
The narrow construction given by this court is clearly inapposite to that 
intention and an example of the worst sort of judicial activism. 
Additionally, the state laws which allow open-field burning of grass 
residue in Idaho all have the word “disposal” in their titles and text, a 
clear indication that the purpose of burning the fields is to get rid of or 
dispose of the crop residue.28 
Additionally, all of the cases addressing the definition of solid 
waste in the recycling/reuse or continuous process context concern the 
by-products of the manufacturing process, not the by-products of 
agriculture.29 This makes a huge difference, as the legislative history of 
the Act makes clear that Congress intended that agricultural waste, 
primarily crop residue and other biomass, be regulated in order to 
recover energy, and in order to encourage its use as food for livestock.30  
As such, the judicial rules developed in the recycling/reuse and 
continuous process cases are inappropriate in the agricultural context. 
Finally, common sense dictates that the crop residue at issue in this 
case should be considered a solid waste. This is so because the farmers 
sold grass crop residue as animal feedstock to area cattle ranchers when 
it was profitable to do so during periods of drought.31 Therefore, they 
cannot claim that grass crop residue is a necessary part of the growing 
process. Common sense should also dictate that if you burn the grass 
                                                                                                             
 27 Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1481 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 28 For example, Title 22, Chapter 48 of the Idaho Code is the Crop Residue Disposal 
Program. Farmers wanting to burn their fields must fill out a Crop Residue Disposal 
Registration Form. 
 29 See, e.g., United States v. Interstate Lead Co., 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(regulating lead plates from spent automotive batteries used as a feedstock for the 
smelting process); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(regulating materials used in mining operations); American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 
906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (regulating K061 slag, a byproduct of the zinc smelting 
process); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (regulating 
secondary materials reused within an ongoing industrial production process). 
 30 SYMPOSIUM ON RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY, 94TH CONG., AGENCY 
TESTIMONY (Comm. Print 1976). 
 31 Br. for Defs.-Appellees at 5, Safe Air (No. 02-35751). 
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residue, only a small percentage of it is returned to the soil as fertilizer. 
The rest of the residue is disposed of into the air where it drifts into 
neighboring communities. Thus, the farmers are externalizing their waste 
disposal problem. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding renders 
superfluous the actual language of the statute, which includes agricultural 
waste in its definition of solid waste. 
These points will be demonstrated through an examination of the 
Act, which contains exemptions in the definition of solid waste for solid 
or dissolved materials in domestic sewage, solid or dissolved materials in 
irrigation return flows, industrial discharges subject to the Clean Water 
Act permitting process and certain by-products of the nuclear energy 
industry, but contains no exemption for crop residues.32 There is no 
exemption for crop residues despite the legislative history, which evinces 
Congressional awareness of the issue of prescribed open-field 
agricultural burning.33 
Both sides have a lot at stake in this matter. Who will ultimately 
prevail depends on the willingness of the Supreme Court of the United 
States to grant certiorari. Thus, the first part of this comment looks at the 
purposes of RCRA and its relevant provisions. In the second part of this 
comment, I will analyze past court decisions that addressed the question 
of what is a “solid waste.” Part three of this comment, explains the facts 
of this case, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho’s 
decision and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district court. Part 
four will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision in light of the legislative 
history and explain why I believe the decision is wrong and should be 
overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
I. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT (“RCRA”) 
Recognizing that the “disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste 
in or on the land without careful planning and management can present a 
danger to human health and the environment,” Congress, in 1976, 
enacted RCRA, commonly referred to as the Solid Waste Disposal Act 
(“SWDA”).34 Congress also found that “inadequate and environmentally 
unsound practices for the disposal or use of solid waste have created 
greater amounts of air and water pollution and other problems for the 
environment and for health.”35 Importantly, with respect to energy, 
Congress declared, that: 
                                                                                                             
 32 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000). 
 33 S. REP. NO. 94-988 (1976). 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2) (2000). 
 35 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (2000). 
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(1) solid waste represents a potential source of solid fuel, oil, or 
gas that can be converted into energy; 
(2) the need exists to develop alternative energy sources for 
public and private consumption in order to reduce our 
dependence on such sources as petroleum products, natural gas, 
nuclear and hydroelectric generation; and  
(3) technology exists to produce usable energy from solid 
waste.36 
These declarations with respect to energy are key to an 
understanding of why crop residues were intended to be considered a 
solid waste subject to RCRA.37 The two objectives of the Act are to 
“promote the protection of health and the environment and to conserve 
valuable material and energy resources.”38 
An understanding of the purposes and structure of RCRA is 
necessary to understand the prior circuit court decisions in the RCRA 
solid waste cases. To put it simply, “RCRA is a comprehensive 
environmental statute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of 
solid and hazardous waste.”39 Hazardous wastes are a sub-category of 
solid wastes and are regulated under Subtitle C, the more onerous and 
burdensome provision of the Act.40 Subtitle C hazardous wastes are 
stringently regulated from the point of generation, to treatment, transport 
and disposal in a cradle to grave manner. Wastes that do not qualify as 
hazardous wastes, because they are neither toxic, corrosive, ignitable nor 
reactive, are simply considered solid wastes and are much less 
stringently regulated under Subtitle D.41 
The plaintiffs did not allege that crop residue is a hazardous waste, 
nor has the EPA specifically listed crop residue as a hazardous waste. 
Although the smoke that is generated from burning the straw is 
hazardous in the conventional sense, the straw itself is not hazardous. 
While you can certainly ignite the straw (after all, that is what the 
defendants do) it is not ignitable under the regulatory definition of 
ignitability because it is not “capable, under standard temperature and 
pressure, of causing fire through friction, absorption of moisture or 
spontaneous chemical changes and, when ignited, [doesn’t] burn[] so 
                                                                                                             
 36 42 U.S.C. § 6901(d) (2000). 
 37 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 38 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2000). 
 39 Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996). 
 40 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 184 (2003). 
 41 Id. at 181. 
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vigorously and persistently that it creates a hazard.”42 Thus, if crop 
residue is considered a waste, it would be a solid waste regulated under 
Subtitle D, not a hazardous waste regulated under Subtitle C. 
The distinction between hazardous waste and solid waste is 
important in the context of this case, because the definition of “solid 
waste” is different if the material is a Subtitle C hazardous waste than it 
is if the material is a Subtitle D solid waste. If the crop residue were a 
hazardous waste, the regulatory definition of “solid waste” would apply 
and that definition is narrower than the statutory definition.43 The 
statutory definition of solid waste is broader: 
The term “solid waste” means any garbage, refuse, sludge from a 
waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air 
pollution control facility and other discarded material, including 
solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting 
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, 
and from community activities, but does not include solid or 
dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved 
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which 
are point sources subject to permits . . . or source, special nuclear, 
or byproduct material . . . .44 
Thus, solid waste includes any discarded material resulting from 
agricultural operations. The debate in this case and in the recycling/reuse 
and continuous process cases is whether or not the material is discarded. 
“The broader statutory definition of solid waste applies to citizen 
suits brought to abate imminent hazard to health or the environment.”45 
Section 6972 of RCRA is the citizen suit provision and provides the 
plaintiffs in this case standing to enjoin the defendants’ actions. It states 
that before filing suit, citizens must give notice to the EPA, the state and 
to any alleged violator in order to give the EPA and the state time to 
begin its own action, and to give the alleged violator time to remedy the 
alleged violation.46 Furthermore, no citizen action may be taken if the 
State has commenced an action against the alleged violator for the 
alleged violation.47 If neither the EPA nor the State have commenced an 
action against the violator, 
                                                                                                             
 42 40 C.F.R. § 261.21(a)(2) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 43 Compare 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2005), with 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000). 
 44 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 45 Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 
1314 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 46 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2000). 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c) (2000). 
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[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . 
against any person, including the United States and any other 
governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted 
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including 
any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past 
or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal 
facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or 
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal 
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.48 
The citizen suit provision was added to the Act with the 1984 
amendments “in an effort to invigorate citizen litigation.”49 The lawsuit 
in this case was filed under this citizen suit provision of RCRA.50 
II. PRIOR CIRCUIT COURT CASES ADDRESSING THE DEFINITION OF 
SOLID WASTE UNDER RCRA 
Before looking at Safe Air’s claim, it is necessary to first review 
RCRA jurisprudence in the context of disputes over what is a solid 
waste. A threshold question is how broadly or narrowly the Act should 
be construed. Once that scope has been determined, the courts have 
considered various questions in order to determine whether a material is 
a solid waste. Among these questions are: Which materials did Congress 
intend to regulate? What relevance is there to the value of the material? 
How much time must pass before a material is considered to be 
discarded? What relevance does subjective intent play in determining 
whether or not a material is a solid waste? The threshold question is 
explored first. 
A. Since RCRA Is a Remedial Statute, Should Its Provisions Be Read 
Broadly or Narrowly? 
In Hanford Downwinders, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit addressed the interpretation of remedial environmental 
statutes.51 Although that case dealt with the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 
the opinion is equally applicable to a case involving RCRA. Hanford 
Downwinders instructs that remedial statutes designed to protect health 
and the environment are liberally construed in order to avoid frustrating 
                                                                                                             
 48 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 49 Ascon Prop., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 50 Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1038. 
 51 Hanford Downwinders, 71 F.3d at 1481. 
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Congress’s remedial intent.52 There can be no doubt that RCRA is a 
remedial statute designed to “promote the protection of health and the 
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy resources.”53 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should follow its own precedent by 
construing RCRA broadly in the context of the questions raised in the 
Safe Air case. 
B. What Material Did Congress Intend to Regulate?: AMC I 
In American Mining Congress v. EPA, (“AMC I”) the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia provided an answer to this 
question, which narrowed the scope of the EPA’s ability to regulate 
waste.54 In an opinion written by Judge Starr,55 the court held that the 
EPA’s regulatory authority was limited to materials that “are ‘discarded’ 
by virtue of being disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away.”56 The court 
further held that Congress did not intend for in-process secondary 
materials to be included in the scope of the Act.57 
American Mining Congress (“AMC”) was one of several trade 
associations representing mining and oil refining interests which 
challenged the EPA’s regulatory definition of “solid waste.”58 The 
regulatory definition would have allowed EPA to regulate secondary 
materials reused within an industry’s ongoing production process.59 
AMC maintained that these materials were neither discarded nor 
intended for discard and that EPA was limited to regulating only those 
materials that had been discarded. Judge Starr agreed, stating that 
“Congress defined ‘solid waste’ as ‘discarded material’. The ordinary, 
plain-English meaning of the word ‘discarded’ is ‘disposed of,’ ‘thrown 
away’ or ‘abandoned.’ Encompassing materials retained for immediate 
reuse within the scope of ‘discarded’ material strains, to say the least, the 
everyday usage of that term.”60 In a footnote, Judge Starr wrote that 
“[t]he dictionary definition of ‘discard’ is ‘to drop, dismiss, let go, or get 
rid of as no longer useful, valuable, or pleasurable.’”61 
                                                                                                             
 52 Id. 
 53 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2000). 
     54  Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 55 Judge Kenneth Starr later became the U.S. Independent Counsel in the Whitewater 
investigation of President Clinton. 
 56 Am. Mining Cong., 824 F.2d at 1193. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1178. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1183-84. 
 61 Id. at 1184 n.7. 
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With these definitions in mind, the court looked at the industrial 
processes at issue.62 In both the petroleum and mining contexts, the 
primary material is processed to create other useful materials: crude oil 
into gasoline, fuel oil and lubricating oils and pure metals extracted from 
natural ore.63 The first pass through the processing system does not 
extract all useful material from the primary material and the leftover 
material must pass through the system again in order to get more out of 
the primary material. Thus, the once-processed ore is reprocessed to 
extract as much pure metal as possible from the natural ore and the 
leftover hydrocarbons from the first refining process are returned to 
system to be reprocessed into oils and fuels.64 In this context, it appeared 
clear to the court that these secondary materials were not discarded 
because they were “materials that are recycled or reused in an ongoing 
manufacturing or industrial process [and that] these materials have not 
yet become part of the waste disposal problem; rather they are destined 
for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the 
generating industry itself.”65 
In his dissent, Judge Mikva argued that EPA’s interpretation of the 
definition of solid waste was reasonable and therefore entitled to 
Chevron deference.66 Judge Mikva stated that in enacting RCRA, 
Congress was concerned with more than just abandoned materials.67 This 
was evident from the statutory definition of “disposal” under RCRA: 
The term “disposal” means the discharge, deposit, injection, 
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or 
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid 
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter 
                                                                                                             
 62 Id. at 1181. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 1186. 
 66 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), 
the Supreme Court held that: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in 
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute. 
 67 AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1196 (Mikva, J., dissenting). 
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the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any 
waters, including ground waters.68 
According to Judge Mikva, “[t]he definition is functional: waste is 
disposed under this provision if it is put into contact with land or water in 
such a way as to pose the risks to health and environment that animated 
Congress to pass RCRA.”69 Importantly, the intent of the manufacturer to 
put the material to an additional use is irrelevant.70 In a sub-part below, I 
will explore the issue of intent to see what other courts have said about 
whether intent is relevant to the question of whether or not a material is a 
solid waste. 
The crop residue at issue in Safe Air is clearly distinguishable from 
the petroleum and natural ore at issue in AMC I. First, AMC I expressly 
applies to materials recycled or reused in an ongoing industrial or 
manufacturing process. The court says nothing about agricultural 
processes or municipal solid wastes. More importantly, the materials in 
AMC I were processed and reprocessed in order to get more and more 
out of the primary material. Crop residue is different. After the farmers 
separate the grass seed from the straw, the straw is not reprocessed to 
extract more seed. Admittedly, if after the grass seed was separated from 
the straw, the crop residue was then reprocessed to extract even more 
seed, then one could make an argument that the industrial and 
manufacturing recycling model should apply and that the crop residue 
was not yet a solid waste. But that is not what the farmers do in Idaho. 
They burn it in order to get rid of it. In doing so, the burning of the crop 
residue is “disposal” under Judge Mikva’s functional definition. Whether 
burning the crop residue provides the farmers with some benefits or has 
value beyond disposing of it is another matter and will be explored in the 
next sub-part. 
C. What Relevance Is There to the Value of the Material?: AMC II, 
Interstate Lead Co., Inc. (“ILCO”) and API 
AMC was back in court in 1990, once again challenging an EPA 
regulation, which specifically listed six materials produced in mining 
operations.71 In this case, commonly referred to as AMC II, AMC argued 
that three of the six wastes were not discarded and therefore not 
considered to be solid waste.72 It based its argument, that the materials 
were not discarded because they were “beneficially reused in mineral 
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 69 AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1196 (Mikva, J. dissenting). 
 70 Id. (Mikva, J. dissenting). 
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processing operations,” on the statutory definition of solid waste and the 
holding in AMC I.73 The materials in this case were sludges in surface 
impoundments which were collected for possible future reclamation.74 
The court, in AMC II, agreed with the EPA that the sludges could be 
regulated because they were not “destined for immediate reuse in another 
phase of the industry’s ongoing production process.”75 Unlike the 
materials in AMC I, the sludges at issue in AMC II did not “pass[] in a 
continuous stream or flow from one production process to another.”76 
The fact that the sludges possessed some value in that they could be 
reused was irrelevant because they were not part of an ongoing industrial 
process and thus had become part of the waste disposal problem.77 
Moreover, unlike the materials in AMC I, the crop residue at issue in Safe 
Air is distinguishable because it is neither the result of an industrial 
operation, nor is it truly part of a continuous stream or flow from one 
production process to another. This will become clear below in part 
three, which explains the Kentucky bluegrass growing process. 
The value issue was also addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. Interstate Lead Co. (“ILCO”).78 The defendant in that 
case was a recycler of spent automotive batteries. The EPA asserted that 
reclaimed lead plates were waste products.79 ILCO’s contention was that 
the lead plates were not a solid waste because they were not discarded 
but were instead a valuable feedstock for the smelting process.80 The 
court held that the EPA’s determination that the lead plates were a solid 
waste was a reasonable interpretation entitled to Chevron deference. 
“Somebody has discarded the battery in which these components are 
found. This fact does not change just because a reclaimer has purchased 
or finds value in the components.”81 
The defendants in Safe Air might argue that ILCO is distinguishable 
because they do not purchase the crop residue, but instead produce it 
themselves. However, the ILCO court expressly recognized and 
incorporated the holding in AMC II, that materials may be classified as 
discarded “whether the materials were discarded by one user and sent to 
another for recycling, or stored before recycling by the person who 
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initially discarded them in land disposal units.”82 Importantly, the ILCO 
court recognized that materials may have both primary and secondary 
characters. The primary character of the lead plates was that they had 
been discarded. The secondary character was that they were a valuable 
recyclable material. “Therefore, we find these batteries and their contents 
are ‘discarded’ within the everyday sense of the word. Their secondary 
character as recyclable material is irrelevant to that determination.”83 
This is important because, as explained in more detail below in part 
three, the primary reason that the crop residue is burned is that it is 
unwanted and must be removed from the fields in order to facilitate the 
growth of the next crop. The primary character of the crop residue is thus 
a discarded material. The secondary character as a source of ash to be 
used as a fertilizer and any other incidental benefits are thus irrelevant to 
the determination of whether the crop residue is a solid waste. 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that K061 slag, a byproduct of the zinc smelting 
process, is a solid waste because it is discarded before being subject to 
metals reclamation.84 In American Petroleum Institute v. EPA (“API”), 
the court stated that: 
[I]t is [] immaterial under AMC [I] that the method of waste 
treatment prescribed by the agency results in the production of 
something of value, namely reclaimed metals. Indeed, the AMC 
[I] decision expressly disavowed a reading of the statute that 
would prevent EPA from regulating processes for extracting 
valuable products from discarded materials that qualify as 
hazardous wastes.85 
The K061 slag at issue in API is analogous to the crop residue at 
issue in Safe Air because the farmers contend that they extract valuable 
fertilizer in the form of ash from the burning process, but that does not 
change the character of the crop residue when it is discarded from the 
combine machines. It is thus immaterial under AMC I that the method of 
waste treatment conducted by the growers results in the production of 
something of value. 
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D. How Much Time Must Pass Before a Material Is Considered To Be 
Discarded?: Connecticut Coastal Fishermen and Owen Electric 
There have been few cases seeking to resolve the issue of how 
much time must pass before a material is considered to be discarded, 
presumably because the AMC I and AMC II courts have made it fairly 
clear that a material must be destined for immediate reuse. Nevertheless, 
the timing issue has been raised in a couple of cases and are thus worth 
examining. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
addressed this issue in Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. 
Remington Arms Co., Inc.86 The defendants in that case owned and 
operated a trap and skeet shooting club, originally formed in the 
1920’s.87 Nearly five million pounds of lead shot and eleven million 
pounds of clay target fragments were deposited on the land and in 
adjacent waters over the seventy years of the club’s existence.88 The 
defendants argued that the lead shot and clay target fragments were not 
solid waste because “any disposal of waste that occurred was merely 
incidental to the normal use of a product.”89 The critical issue thus 
became: “[a]t what point after a lead shot is fired at a clay target do the 
materials become discarded? Does the transformation from useful to 
discarded material take place the instant the shot is fired or sometime 
later?”90 The court did not give an exact answer to this question, but 
simply said that in this case the materials had accumulated long enough 
to be considered solid waste. Thus, at one extreme, materials that have 
accumulated for seventy years have been discarded and at the other 
extreme, materials destined for immediate reuse have not been discarded. 
A case out of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed 
the immediacy requirement, even when combined with a value issue. The 
sole issue in Owen Electric Steel Co. v. Browner was “whether the ‘slag’ 
produced by petitioner Owen . . . as a byproduct of steel production 
[was] ‘discarded’ and therefore constitute[d] a ‘solid waste’ under 
[RCRA].”91 The court held that “the fundamental inquiry in determining 
whether a byproduct has been ‘discarded’ is whether the byproduct is 
immediately recycled for use in the same industry.”92 The slag in Owen 
Electric sat curing for six months before being sold to other entities and 
thus was discarded and classified as a solid waste. This case is interesting 
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because it combines the timing issue with the value issue and found that 
the slag was a solid waste. Another issue in this case, and in all of these 
cases for that matter, is the issue of whether the stated intent of the waste 
disposer or waste generator makes any difference. This is the final issue 
and is explored in the next sub-part. 
E. What Relevance Does Stated Intent Play in Determining Whether or 
Not a Material Is a Solid Waste?: Fiorillo and AMC II Revisited. 
Should the generator’s stated intent be considered in determining 
whether the material is discarded, abandoned or disposed of, or should 
actions speak louder than words? In other words, should Judge Mikva’s 
dissent control, making the definition a functional definition? Both the 
Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have held that stated intent makes no 
difference, and that the court must look to the actual intent instead. 
In United States v. Fiorillo, the Ninth Circuit heard the appeals of 
Frank Fiorillo and Art Krueger for their criminal convictions of wire 
fraud and violations of RCRA.93 Fiorillo and Krueger, who both operated 
warehousing businesses, had contracted with a manufacturer of industrial 
cleaning products for the disposal of 30,000 gallons of highly caustic 
industrial strength cleansers.94 In fact, only a small percentage of the 
waste was properly disposed of in accordance with RCRA.95 The rest 
was illegally stored in warehouses, which also contained Class A 
explosives, including 17,000 artillery shells.96 Krueger argued that his 
conviction under RCRA should be overturned because there was not 
enough evidence to conclude that the cleaning products were hazardous 
wastes.97 The court held that in order to prove that the cleaning products 
were hazardous wastes, the government was required to demonstrate that 
the products had been discarded. If the manufacturer of the cleaning 
products “intended to dispose of the hazardous materials, it became 
hazardous waste.”98 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the actual 
intent of the generator, not the stated intent, is the key to determine 
whether or not a material is discarded. This is a functional definition. 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit was unimpressed with AMC’s argument 
that they did not intend to discard the sludges from wastewater stored in 
surface impoundments, but were instead saving them for future 
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beneficial reclamation.99 While there was no explicit discussion in that 
case about whether intent was a factor in their decision, their holding 
indicates that a lack of intent to discard would not have made a 
difference. In part four, I will examine whether intent should play a part 
in deciding whether a material has been discarded. 
III. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN SAFE AIR FOR EVERYONE AND THE 
DEFENDANT FARMERS 
A. How to Grow Kentucky Bluegrass: The Basics 
Before examining the court’s opinion, it is first necessary to 
understand the basics of growing Kentucky bluegrass. Initially, the seed 
is planted in the spring, but does not flower until the summer of the 
following year.100 Once the grass has grown between fifteen and thirty-
six inches and has flowered, the farmers cut the crop within a few inches 
of the ground.101 This leaves some stubble that is needed for plant 
regeneration. Subsequent years’ crops grow out of the crown of the 
bluegrass plant, which is located at or below the soil surface, under the 
stubble, which is why the farmers cannot simply plough under the crop 
residue.102 The cut crop is left in the field to dry for several weeks.103 The 
seed is then harvested using combines that separate the seed from the 
straw.104 The valuable seed is then collected and sold while the residue 
including the straw and the stubble are left in the field. This residue must 
be removed in order to allow moisture and sunlight to reach the crown 
during the fall regeneration period.105 The residue can either be removed 
mechanically, or it can be removed by burning it away.106 The farmers in 
this case remove the crop residue by burning it. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Affirming the District Court in Safe Air 
For Everyone v. Meyer 
Judge Ronald M. Gould, joined by Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, 
wrote the three-part opinion.107 An understanding of how Kentucky 
bluegrass is grown is needed to understand the defendant’s motivations. 
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Thus, the opinion began in Part I with a primer on the growing of 
Kentucky bluegrass and a brief summary of the procedural history.108 
Part II of the opinion discussed the procedural posture of the case in 
greater detail.109 Part III was the heart of the opinion and reviewed the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.110 
1. Opinion Part I 
After a primer on Kentucky bluegrass farming, the court briefly 
explained the procedural history of the case: Safe Air filed suit on May 
31, 2002, under RCRA’s citizen suit provisions, alleging that the 
defendant’s practice of open field burning caused a substantial 
endangerment to health and the environment.111 The plaintiff also sought 
a preliminary injunction to prevent the farmers from continuing the 
practice of burning the post-harvest residue.112 The farmers filed a 
response in opposition to the preliminary injunction and a motion to 
dismiss the claim based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.113 The 
district court held an evidentiary hearing on Safe Air’s request for a 
preliminary injunction during three days of testimony from July 10-12, 
2002, hearing testimony from twenty-three witnesses.114 On July 19, 
2002, the district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it did 
not have subject matter jurisdiction, because, among other reasons, the 
crop residue at issue was not “solid waste” under RCRA.115 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded Part I noting that Safe Air appealed, that federal courts 
had subject matter jurisdiction, but that it was affirming the lower court’s 
decision.116 
2. Opinion Part II 
Safe Air’s appeal was based on two arguments. Its first argument 
was that the district court erred by considering evidence from the 
preliminary injunction hearing, evidence which was outside the four 
corners of the complaint.117 The plaintiff argued that the court should 
have converted the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion 
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under Rule 56.118 Its second argument maintained that the district court 
erred by holding that the question of whether the crop residue was a solid 
waste was a jurisdictional issue.119 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the 
first argument, but agreed with the second argument.120 It held that “[t]he 
district court erred in characterizing its dismissal of Safe Air’s complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(1) because the jurisdictional issue and substantive 
issues in this case are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is 
dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits.”121 
Additionally, the court stated that “[i]n resolving a factual attack on 
jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint 
without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment.”122 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district 
court’s order not as a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but 
as a grant of summary judgment on the merits for the farmers.123 
3. Opinion Part III 
Because the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order as a 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the farmers, the standard of 
review was de novo.124 Thus, the court stated that it would view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to Safe Air to determine whether there 
were any genuine issues of material fact.125 The court then provided a 
cursory overview of RCRA and noted that Safe Air had the burden to 
establish that the Kentucky bluegrass residue was “solid waste” within 
the meaning of RCRA.126 
After a brief overview of the canons of statutory construction, the 
court discussed the statutory definition of “solid waste” under RCRA.127 
Focusing on “other discarded material,” the court noted that RCRA does 
not define “discarded material,” but that the dictionary defines “discard” 
as to “cast aside; reject; abandon; give up.”128 “We consider the term 
‘discard’ in its ordinary meaning to decide whether Safe Air presented a 
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genuine issue of material fact supporting its contention that the Kentucky 
bluegrass residue burnt by the Growers is ‘solid waste’ under RCRA.”129 
The court next discussed prior circuit court cases addressing the 
question of what is a solid waste, focusing its attention on those aspects 
of the cases that it believed helped answer the question. First, the court 
reviewed AMC I. “Significant for our purposes, AMC I determined that 
materials have not contributed to a waste disposal problem where ‘they 
are destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by 
the generating industry itself.’”130 Next, it considered AMC II’s holding 
that materials being held for potential reuse constitute discarded 
material.131  The court also considered the time element by looking at the 
language of Connecticut Coastal, where the Second Circuit held that the 
material had “accumulated long enough.”132  Finally, the court addressed 
the value element as discussed in ILCO. In a footnote, the court stated: 
We recognize that the issue of monetary value does not affect the 
analysis of whether materials are “solid waste” under RCRA. As 
the Eleventh Circuit held in ILCO, the fact that discarded 
materials are “solid waste” under RCRA does not change “just 
because a reclaimer has purchased or finds value in the 
components.” However, in this case the Growers do not base 
their argument on the assertion that grass residue has monetary 
value to someone; rather, the Growers argue that grass residue is 
not solid waste because they immediately reuse it to further 
successful bluegrass harvests.133 
Finding these cases to be persuasive, the Ninth Circuit decided to 
evaluate the evidence to determine: (1) whether the crop residue is 
destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the 
farmers themselves (an AMC I analysis); (2) whether the crop residue is 
being actively reused, or whether it merely has the potential to be reused 
(an AMC II analysis); and (3) whether the crop residue is being reused by 
the farmers or by someone else (an ILCO analysis).134 Judge Gould then 
reviewed the evidence presented in the hearing on Safe Air’s request for 
a preliminary injunction. The bulk of the opinion with regard to the 
evidence focused on the evidence submitted by the farmers. First, the 
court noted that the farmers presented evidence that they do not discard 
the crop residue, but rather reuse it in a continuous process of growing 
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Kentucky bluegrass and that this reuse provides the benefits of both 
returning nutrients to the soil and facilitating the open burning process.135 
Additionally, the farmers presented evidence that open burning provides 
four critical benefits for Kentucky bluegrass farmers. First, open field 
burning extends the productive life of the fields. Second, open field 
burning restores beneficial minerals and fertilizers to the fields. Third, 
open field burning reduces or eliminates insects, weeds, and disease, 
reducing the need to use pesticides. Finally, open field burning blackens 
the soil, maximizing sunlight absorption.136 
Safe Air did not dispute that the grass residue provided some 
benefit to the farmers, but that the claimed benefits were merely 
incidental and that the primary goal of burning the residue is to get rid of 
it.137 The court was not persuaded by Safe Air’s argument that the benefit 
must be more than merely incidental, holding that “even when we review 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Safe Air, there is no dispute 
that the Growers realize farming benefits from reusing grass residue in 
the process of open burning.”138 Furthermore, the court held that: 
Because there is undisputed evidence that the Growers reuse the 
grass residue in a continuous farming process effectively designed to 
produce Kentucky bluegrass, there is no genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether grass residue is ‘discarded material.’ It is not. The bluegrass 
residue is not discarded, abandoned, or given up, and it does not qualify 
as ‘solid waste’ under RCRA.139 
Applying the factors noted in the other circuit court cases, the court 
found that the grass residue is destined for immediate beneficial reuse by 
the farmers who were its original owners, and that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether grass residue is discarded.140 
Turning his attention to RCRA’s legislative history, Judge Gould 
opined that “the burning of bluegrass residue by farmers is not the evil 
against which Congress took aim.”141 Citing a House Report, the court 
noted that “RCRA was intended as ‘a multi-faceted approach toward 
solving the problems associated with the 3-4 billion tons of discarded 
materials generated each year, and the problems resulting from 
anticipated 8% annual increase in the volume of such waste.’”142 
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Importantly, the court cited the same House Report which stated that 
“much industrial and agricultural waste is reclaimed or put to new use 
and is therefore not a part of the discarded materials disposal problem the 
committee addresses . . . . Agricultural wastes which are returned to the 
soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners are not considered discarded 
materials in the sense of this legislation.”143 
In a footnote, Judge Gould wrote what I consider to be the portion 
of the opinion most open to criticism. I will address these criticisms in 
part four of this comment. Its significance is such that it is reprinted here 
in its entirety: 
Referring to the House Report’s comment that “agricultural 
wastes which are returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil 
conditions are not considered discarded materials in the sense of 
this legislation,” Safe Air argues that “if the Growers mulched 
their residue and returned it to the soil, this sentence might have 
applicability. But that is not what they do. They burn the residue . 
. . .” This argument has some weight but is not dispositive. It is 
true that a part of the residue is returned to soil while a part that 
is smoke is carried off by air. Yet, for materials to be solid waste 
under RCRA, they must be “discarded.” The determination of 
whether grass residue has been “discarded” is made 
independently of how the materials are handled. Despite the fact 
that a portion of residue becomes airborne smoke, the residue is 
not thereby automatically “discarded.”144 
Finally, the court addressed the four arguments made by the dissent 
and concluded its opinion by stating that it could not discern any 
congressional declaration or intent to prohibit the established farming 
practice of open field burning, the fact that there were benefits to the 
farmers was beyond dispute, and that there was no issue of material fact 
as to whether the grass residue was a solid waste under RCRA.145 Since, 
in the court’s opinion, the grass residue was not a solid waste, the court 
declined to address whether the farmers’ handling constituted “disposal,” 
“treatment,” or “handling” of solid waste, nor did it address whether the 
burning of the fields constitutes an “imminent and substantial 
endangerment” under RCRA.146 
                                                                                                             
 143 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6238, 6239). 
 144 Id. at 1046 n.13 (emphasis in the original). 
 145 Id. at 1047. 
 146 Id. 
2005] SAFE AIR FOR EVERYONE EXCEPT IDAHO 259 
4. Judge Paez’s Dissent 
Judge Paez concurred with Part II of the majority opinion, 
concluding that the court should review the district court’s dismissal for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a grant of summary judgment on the 
merits.147  However, he dissented with regard to Part III because he 
disagreed with the legal standard applied by the majority.148 It was his 
conclusion that the grass residue was discarded and that RCRA should 
apply to grass residue.149 Furthermore, even if he were to agree with the 
majority’s interpretation of RCRA, he felt that there were genuine issues 
of material fact and he would therefore reverse the district court’s 
judgment and remand for trial.150 
Judge Paez had no trouble concluding that Safe Air had presented 
sufficient evidence to show that the grass residue was discarded. He 
discussed the fact that Safe Air presented testimony as well as affidavits 
from its members, individuals in the community and experts in the 
medical and agricultural fields.151 Safe Air established that it is necessary 
to remove the grass residue in order to maintain seed yields, and it was 
the plaintiff’s contention that the primary purpose of burning the fields is 
to remove the grass residue.152 The farmers did not dispute Safe Air’s 
contention that they must remove the grass residue from the fields. As 
such, Judge Paez concluded that “[b]ecause there is no dispute that the 
Growers burn the post-harvest residue to remove it from the fields, and 
because this act of removal is within the plain meaning of ‘discard,’ I 
would reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further 
proceedings.”153 
As to statutory construction, Judge Paez argued that the majority 
looked beyond the plain meaning of the word “discard” when it 
considered the factors gleaned from the other circuit court cases 
addressing the meaning of the word “discard.”154 Furthermore, those 
cases cited by the majority occurred in distinctly different contexts.155 
Finally, even if those cases were to be considered, he would conclude 
that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the grass 
residue is destined for beneficial reuse in a continual process.156 
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The dissent’s review of the legislative history was more 
comprehensive than that of the majority. For example, Judge Paez 
pointed out that “Congress intended solid waste to include any discarded 
material resulting from agricultural operations.”157 Additionally, he noted 
that “[w]hen RCRA was enacted, agricultural waste was the second 
largest source of waste in this country, producing 687 million tons per 
year.”158 Furthermore, EPA regulation 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(2) indicates 
that residue from agricultural crops returned to the soil as fertilizers are 
solid wastes, but not hazardous wastes.159 Judge Paez stated that 
Congress could not have intended to exclude from the scope of RCRA 
agricultural waste that is first burned before being used as a fertilizer, 
given Congress’s expressed concern with waste which is burned and 
results in harmful air pollution.160 “Thus, the fact that the residue is 
burned, rather than mulched and returned to the soil, is relevant to 
whether the residue constitutes ‘solid waste’ under RCRA.”161 
Judge Paez criticized the majority for finding the extra-circuit cases 
persuasive in its analysis, because those cases were dealing with solid 
wastes that were also hazardous wastes, thus implicating the narrower 
regulatory definition of solid waste.162 He stated that, once again, even if 
he were to find those cases persuasive, there were genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether the materials had been discarded, thus making 
summary judgment inappropriate.163 The crux of the dispute was that 
Safe Air contended that the farmers’ primary purpose in burning the 
grass residue is to remove it, whereas the farmers contended that the 
grass residue is an important and valuable material used in the 
agricultural process. “Thus, there are decidedly different accounts of 
whether and how the post-harvest crop residue factors into the continuing 
growth process.”164 In fact, Safe Air presented expert testimony 
vigorously contesting the farmers’ assertion that they reuse the grass 
residue in a continuous process.165 
In the last part of his dissent, Judge Paez addressed whether the 
burning of the grass residue “constituted past or present handling, 
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous 
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waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health or the environment.”166 He concluded, based on the statutory 
definitions of “treatment” and “disposal” that RCRA applies to the 
burning of the grass residue and that he would reverse the summary 
judgment in favor of the farmers and remand the case for trial.167 
  
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION SHOULD BE 
OVERTURNED 
There are several reasons why the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the 
Safe Air case should be overturned. First, the legislative history evinces 
congressional concern with the amount of agricultural waste being 
produced, coupled with existing poor disposal practices and a recognition 
that crop residues could be used as a source of energy and animal 
feedstock. Second, previously decided circuit court cases addressing the 
question of what is a solid waste have never addressed the question of 
agricultural waste. All of the prior cases dealt with industrial and mining 
wastes. Congress recognized the difference as is evident from the 
legislative history. The courts should recognize that difference as well. 
Third, common sense tells us that the farmers are primarily concerned 
with getting rid of the crop residue. That they derive some benefit from 
the ash that remains is inconsequential. I will address each of these 
reasons in turn. 
A. Legislative History 
First, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended 
crop residue to be considered a solid waste. Congress enacted RCRA to 
deal with the ever increasing problem of waste disposal in the United 
States. In a statement to the Senate, Senator Randolph stated that “our 
society generates 4.4 billion tons of solid waste annually. The principal 
sources are animal wastes, 1.7 billion tons; and agricultural wastes, 640 
million tons. Industrial sources account for 140 million tons. Urban 
wastes amount to 230 million tons annually.”168 Similarly, in a statement 
to the House, Congressman Brown stated: 
Many kinds of waste are covered by the term “solid waste.” 
About 2.8 billion tons of all kinds of solid waste are generated 
every year in the United States. Of this, about 1.783 million tons 
are from mining; 687 million tons are agricultural; 260 million 
                                                                                                             
 166 Id. at 1053 (Paez, J. dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)). 
 167 Id. at 1053-54 (Paez, J. dissenting). 
 168 121 CONG. REC. 23849 (1975). 
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tons are industrial; 135 million tons are municipal; and 7 million 
tons are sewage sludge. These last two categories usually attract 
the most attention and present the worst problem because both 
our populations and the wastes are concentrated in the same 
places. Because of the volume of municipal waste generated and 
its concentration, municipal landfills are about to reach their 
capacity.169 
The legislative history makes it clear that agricultural wastes were 
covered by the term “solid waste” under RCRA. 
The agricultural wastes that Congress was concerned with when it 
enacted RCRA were, for the most part, crop residues. Congress 
recognized that agricultural wastes were not the kind of wastes that were 
overflowing municipal landfills. Instead, crop residues represented a 
potential source of energy. It is important to remember that RCRA is the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. “The term ‘resource recovery’ 
means material or energy recovered from solid waste.”170 Congress was 
not just concerned about overflowing landfills; it was also concerned 
with energy recovery and it saw the potential for energy recovery in crop 
residue. For example, David T. Bardin of the New Jersey State 
Environmental Protection Agency testified before Congress that: 
The possible savings are even more dramatic in the case of 
agriculture and plant wastes, which could either be burned or 
converted to animal feed with a great savings in energy. Indeed if 
this country, rural areas as well as urbanized areas, were to 
recover only fifty percent of the energy potential of agricultural 
and other plant life, we would supply ten percent of the country’s 
total energy needs.171 
In another hearing, Dr. James S. Kane, Deputy Assistant 
Administrator for the Conservation, Energy Research and Development 
Administration stated: 
We must search for the hundreds of ways in which our society 
wastes energy and set about to correct each one. Waste utilization 
is an excellent example. Rather than using energy to get rid of 
waste, we will seek uses of all sorts which can yield useful 
energy. We are, therefore, planning a high priority program that 
includes research and development of technologies for the 
recovery of energy from all kinds of wastes: municipal, 
                                                                                                             
 169 122 CONG. REC. 32598 (1976). 
 170 42 U.S.C. § 6903(22) (2000). 
 171 EPA, ERDA, Interior, Commerce and Justice Testimony at House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Subcommittee Symposium on Resource Conservation and Recovery, 
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industrial, agricultural, and forestry. The potential energy from 
utilization of solid wastes is large, totaling something over 1 
billion tons per year, with a carbon content equivalent to about 
500 million tons of coal. This includes municipal residues—trash 
and garbage; agricultural residues—such as wheat and cornstalks 
and including animal wastes; and forestry wastes—sawdust, 
shavings, bark, and scrap, but excluding slash remaining in the 
forests. Nearly three-fourths of this is associated with agricultural 
and animal wastes.172 
During that same hearing, Roger W. Sant, Assistant Administrator 
for Energy Conservation and the Environment of the Federal Energy 
Administration testified that “[a]gricultural residues contain significantly 
more latent energy than urban wastes. Most agricultural waste is quite 
dispersed and much of it is unavailable from energy and economic 
standpoints. However, given the large volume of agricultural wastes, 
utilizing even a small percentage of it as an energy source would be 
significant.”173 
Thus, there is an extensive legislative history focusing on the 
recovery of energy from crop residue. RCRA was enacted when the 
country was still suffering economically from the oil embargo of 1973 
and the resulting energy crisis, so, it makes sense that Congress intended 
to include crop residue under RCRA. What, other than crop residue, 
could Congress have been concerned with when it stated that “[t]he term 
‘solid waste’ means any garbage, refuse . . . or other discarded material . 
. . resulting from . . . agricultural operations”?174 
There are two portions of the legislative history that might appear 
to undermine this argument. However, I will demonstrate that these 
portions provide further support for my argument. The first of these was 
a comment in a Senate Committee Report which stated that: 
If guidelines on open dumping are published for agricultural 
waste management, the Committee intends that such guidelines 
reflect that fire (prescribed or controlled burning) has historically 
been a tool in agriculture, forestry, and wildlife management 
operations. These uses of prescribed or controlled fire are being 
                                                                                                             
 172 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Hearing on H.R. 5487 and H.R. 
406 Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 457 (1976) (Statement of Dr. James S. 
Kane, Deputy Assistant Administrator, New Jersey Department of Environmental 
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 173 Id. at 532 (Statement of Roger W. Sant, Assistant Administrator for Energy 
Conservation and the Environment of the Federal Energy Administration). 
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regulated by the States under the Clean Air Act and the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act.175 
It would be a mistake to read this comment to exclude all types of 
agricultural burning from the scope of RCRA. First, the comment was 
made with reference to guidelines on open dumping. This is not what the 
farmers are doing with the grass residue here. Second, and more 
importantly, Congress was aware that fire had historically been a tool 
used in agriculture, yet it did not choose to include prescribed or 
controlled burning in its list of exceptions to the definition of “solid 
waste.”176 Thus, the comment should not be read to insert language that 
Congress could have, but did not write into the statute. 
The second comment from the legislative history that might be read 
adversely to my argument was referenced in note thirteen of the majority 
opinion and is discussed in part three of this comment, regarding 
agricultural wastes which are returned to the soil as fertilizers.177 The 
specific comment from the legislative history was that “agricultural 
wastes which are returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners are 
not considered discarded materials in the sense of this legislation.”178 
Agricultural interests would contend, in light of this comment, that by 
burning the crop residue, they are returning fertilizers to the soil. Safe 
Air argued that this portion of the legislative history is applicable to crop 
residue that is mulched or ploughed under. Interestingly, the majority 
agreed with Safe Air that its argument had some weight but did not find 
it dispositive.179 If the argument had some weight, then the court, looking 
at the evidence in a light most favorable to Safe Air, should not have 
granted summary judgment for the farmers. The majority included a 
standard recitation of the standard of review for summary judgment.180 
However, it is a question of fact, not a question of law, whether the 
                                                                                                             
 175 S. REP. NO. 94-988, at 13 (1976). 
 176 Recall that under 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27), the exceptions to the definition of “solid 
waste” is limited to “solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved 
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources 
subject to permits . . . or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material . . . .” 
 177 Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1046 n.13. 
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 179 Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1046 n.13. 
 180 Id. at 1040 n.4.  Here, the court stated: 
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farmers were returning fertilizers to the soil or whether they were getting 
rid of the crop residue. 
Unfortunately for Safe Air, the majority did, in fact, weigh the 
evidence and in doing so granted summary judgment to the farmers. 
B. Prior Circuit Court Cases 
The second reason that Safe Air should be overturned is that the 
prior circuit court cases that addressed the issue of what is a solid waste 
all dealt with industrial and mining wastes that were also hazardous 
wastes. Agricultural wastes are different. Thus there is no reason to 
believe that EPA regulations for hazardous waste disposal, nor judicially 
created factors used to help determine whether an industrial or mining 
waste is a solid waste, should also be used to help determine whether 
agricultural wastes are solid wastes. This is because RCRA was 
supposed to address not only the problems of overflowing landfills and 
hazardous waste disposal, but also the need to convert animal and 
agricultural waste into fuels for energy recovery. The legislative history 
makes it clear that industrial waste was contributing to the problem of 
overflowing landfills, but that agricultural waste, primarily crop residue, 
was not. When the majority stated that “[t]he burning of bluegrass 
residue by farmers is not the evil against which Congress took aim,”181 it 
focused on the landfill problem addressed by RCRA but ignored the 
other purpose of RCRA, energy recovery. Crop residue does not need to 
be part of the problem in order to be a “solid waste,” because it was 
hoped that it could be part of the solution to the country’s energy needs. 
C. Common Sense 
The third reason that Safe Air should be overturned is based on 
common sense reasoning. Common sense tells us that what the farmers 
are doing in this case is disposing or getting rid of the grass residue. If 
the farmers burn their fields and ninety-nine percent of the crop residue 
is either consumed in the fire or drifts off into neighboring communities 
in the form of smoke and only one percent of the crop residue remains in 
the field, does it make any sense to say that what the farmers are doing is 
returning fertilizers to the soil? They burn it to get rid of it and the 
burning happens to leave some useful ash residue behind. An analogous 
argument was used by the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit in National Mining Ass’n v. United States Army 
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Corps of Engineers.182 That case was concerned with incidental fallback 
during dredging operations and whether this incidental fallback of the 
dredged materials constituted an addition of a pollutant under the Clean 
Water Act. The court held that: 
[T]he straightforward statutory term “addition” cannot 
reasonably be said to encompass the situation in which material 
is removed from the waters of the United States and a small 
portion of it happens to fall back. Because incidental fallback 
represents a net withdrawal, not an addition, of material, it cannot 
be a discharge. . . . Congress could not have contemplated that 
the attempted removal of 100 tons of that substance could 
constitute an addition simply because only 99 tons of it were 
actually taken away.183 
Like the dredged material in National Mining Ass’n, Congress 
could not have intended that burning agricultural residue, which leaves 
only trace amounts of usable material behind, could constitute a return to 
the soil as fertilizer. Here, there is clearly a net disposal through burning, 
not a return to the soil as fertilizer. Therefore, common sense tells us that 
the farmers are discarding the crop residue, not recycling or reusing it in 
a continuous process. 
Similarly, the farmers contended that burning is an integral step in a 
continuous process. However, when there was money to be made, they 
sold the crop residue to area cattle farmers for use as cattle feedstock. 
Thus, burning is not an essential step in a recycling process. This 
strengthens Safe Air’s argument that the farmers want to get rid of the 
grass residue in the most economic way possible. Can it really be said 
that this is the same thing as “recycling or reuse” or “returning the 
fertilizers to the soil?” The farmers’ actual intent as it can be inferred 
from their actions is the issue here, not their post-hoc stated intent. If the 
Ninth Circuit follows its own precedent,184 then it should look to the 
farmers’ actual intent, and if it does look to the farmers’ actual intent, 
then there is clearly a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. 
Finally, common sense tells us that Congress intended to include 
crop residue in its definition of solid waste because any other conclusion 
would render superfluous the words “agricultural waste” contained 
within the statute. It would make no sense for Congress to include in its 
definition of solid waste the term “agricultural waste” if it did not intend 
that crop residue would be covered by RCRA. Keeping in mind that one 
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of the primary purposes of RCRA was to find alternative energy 
sources,185 what else, besides crop residue, could Congress have been 
concerned with when it included agricultural waste within its definition 
of solid waste? What was Senator Randolph referring to when he said 
that our society produces 640 million tons of agricultural waste annually, 
if not crop residue?186 
Because the legislative history and common sense tell us that 
Congress intended crop residue to be included in the definition of solid 
waste, and because none of the prior circuit court cases deal with the 
unique character of agricultural waste, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Safe Air should be overturned. The farmers should be enjoined from 
burning the grass residue because it poses a substantial and imminent 
endangerment to both health and the environment. 
In conclusion, it is evident that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was 
poorly reasoned. A more searching analysis of RCRA’s legislative 
history, viewed through the lens of the energy crisis of the early 1970’s, 
would have revealed that Congress clearly intended that crop residues 
should be included in the definition of “solid waste” because crop 
residues were seen as a potential source of energy. Thus, applying the 
industrial and manufacturing solid waste model to agricultural wastes 
makes no sense, given the two purposes of RCRA: (1) stemming the 
rising tide of waste in landfills from industrial, manufacturing and 
municipal solid wastes, and (2) finding new sources of energy from 
agricultural and animal wastes.187 Moreover, common sense tells us that 
these farmers are simply getting rid of the waste in the least expensive 
manner possible. Their intent is to discard the waste. Therefore, the crop 
residue is a solid waste and the plaintiff should be able to enjoin the 
farmers from burning their fields and causing health problems for the 
citizens of the surrounding communities.  
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